

Extreme mass homicide: From military massacre to genocide

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Abstract

Several examples of genocide from Armenia, the Ukraine, and Rwanda, of systematic political slaughter (Cambodia), and of massacres in Nanking, My Lai, Viet Nam, and El Salvador are examined. Massacre typically occurs during wars, genocide, and political slaughter typically after a war has occurred and further conflict is feared. Political and historical factors shape the selection of a target group. One prominent feature is the belief that the target group obtained unfair advantage in the past. The social violence is then justified as revenge. Symbolic restructuring of the target group leads to their being viewed as viral or cancerous. This perception justifies the killing of nonviolent target group members on the basis of future risk.

Whereas most genocides emphasize “efficient” slaughter, massacres are generally more cruel. Rape, torture, and mutilation typically precede killing. Many soldiers engage in these actions, although no information suggests they have propensities for rape, sexual sadism, or sadistic violence in civilian life. The extreme cruelty is therefore hard to explain using forensic trait theories. Social psychological theories of state-determined violence explain the transition to violence, if not the extremity observed. A suggestion is made for a form of forensic ethology that

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examines human actions in war settings based on survivor reports and tribunal transcripts and combines these with existing corroborative information on perpetrators.

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*Cruelty has a human heart
And jealousy a human face,
Terror the human form divine,
And secrecy the human dress.*

*The human dress is forged iron,
The human form a fiery forge,
The human face a furnace seal'd,
The human heart its hungry gorge.*

—William Blake,
Songs of Experience

1. Introduction

The 20th century, far from uniquely representing advances in post-Renaissance “civilization,” witnessed the greatest number of systematic slaughters of human beings within any century in history (Power, 2002, see also Tuchman, 1979). Indeed, the 20th century may become historically infamous for introducing a sinister type of aggression; genocide, a term that did not exist in the lexicon of homicide until post World War II. It was coined by Rafael Lemkin, a Polish Jew who escaped the Holocaust and lobbied tirelessly for recognition of a form of mass killing of groups of people defined by the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948, as acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group. Such acts include killing members of the group, causing serious bodily harm or mental harm to members of the group, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life to bring about its destruction in whole or in part, imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (Power, 2002). The focus of this paper will be the psychological factors, both social and individual, used to explain mass social violence. We will examine massacres, political slaughter, and genocide. These three forms of political violence are by no means exhaustive. For a more complete taxonomy of ethnopolitical violence, see Suedfeld (1999). We will not review here examples of various forms of terrorism, suppression, or retaliatory persecution described by Suedfeld. These are beyond our current scope: to understand the psychology of genocide and military massacre.

History, prior to the 20th century, has of course been replete with the elimination of groups of people whether in biblical references to the elimination of the Philistines by the Israelites (Amos 1:6–8), the destruction of Carthage by the Romans (including rubbing salt into the ground, so nothing new would grow, and an estimated 150,000 killed), and later the massacre of “infidels” by both sides during the Crusades of the 12th and 13th century (Asbridge, 2003; Phillips, 2003). Further incidents include the successful and bloody sieges of cities as disparate as Moscow, Kiev, Baghdad, Samarkand, and Beijing by Genghis Khan in the 13th century (Weatherford, 2004) and the extermination of the Huguenots by Louis XIV. Some would include in this lamentable litany the Spanish conquest of South America, the state-inspired slaying of Jews in tsarist Russia, the bounty imposed on Apache scalps in 19th century Mexico (Sweeney, 1991), and the extirpation of Beothucks in Newfoundland (Rowe, 1977). These in no way, of course, constitute a complete list. For a more comprehensive review, see Charney (1999). We are unaware of any prolonged period of human history that is not marked by ethnopolitical violence. Exacerbation of ethnopolitical violence in 20th century may have been due to globalization of the economy leading to increases in discrepancies between rich and poor (Chirot, 1998), to increased information dissemination (leading to rebelliousness among the politically oppressed), or to rapid social change (leading to chaos and a psychological need to assert the tribe). Also, the collapse of the Soviet Union has generated volatility and mass slaughter in numerous states from Yugoslavia to Somalia. (Suedfeld, 1999). Finally, Wynne-Edwards (1962) proposed a homeostatic theory of population regulation where species attempt to regulate population size. As overpopulation increases relative to available food, warfare and violence increase.

The forms of this politically motivated homicide include aggression against individuals (state execution, execution of dissidents, “disappearing” suspected dissidents, as in Argentina) and groups (war, with victims defined nationally or geographically; pogrom or massacre, the victims more specifically defined by any characteristic as out-group, originally identified with tsarist state-inspired massacre of Jews in their shtetls; genocide, the victims defined by religious or ethnic group membership as occurred in the United States, at the Sand Creek massacre of the Cheyenne in 1864,¹ Germany, and Rwanda; and systematic political slaughter, with victims defined by political ideology or expediency, as occurred in Cambodia and Stalinist USSR). The use by familiar groups of massive aggression at its most extreme is well known (for example, the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the firebombing of Dresden²) but is regarded as less reprehensible in the context of war. In war,

¹ In the spring of 1864, while the Civil War raged in the east, (Commander) Chivington launched a campaign of violence against the Cheyenne and their allies, his troops attacking any and all Indians and razing their villages. The Cheyenne, joined by neighboring Arapahos, Sioux, Comanche, and Kiowa in both Colorado and Kansas, went on the defensive warpath. After a summer of scattered small raids and clashes, White and Indian representatives met at Camp Weld outside of Denver on September 28. No treaties were signed, but the Indians believed that by reporting and camping near army posts, they would be declaring peace and accepting sanctuary.

Black Kettle was a peace-seeking chief of a band of some 600 Southern Cheyennes and Arapahos that followed the buffalo along the AR River of Colorado and Kansas. They reported to Fort Lyon and then camped on Sand Creek about 40 miles north.

Shortly afterward, Chivington led a force of about 700 men into Fort Lyon and gave the garrison notice of his plans for an attack on the Indian encampment. Although he was informed that Black Kettle has already surrendered, Chivington pressed on with what he considered the perfect opportunity to further the cause for Indian extinction. On the morning of November 29, he led his troops, many of them drinking heavily, to Sand Creek and positioned them, along with their four howitzers, around the Indian village.

Black Kettle ever trusting raised both an American and a white flag of peace over his tepee. In response, Chivington raised his arm for the attack. Chivington wanted a victory, not prisoners, and so men, women, and children were hunted down and shot.

With cannons and rifles pounding them, the Indians scattered in panic. Then the crazed soldiers charged and killed anything that moved. A few warriors managed to fight back to allow some of the tribe to escape across the stream, including Black Kettle.

The colonel was as thorough as he was heartless. An interpreter living in the village testified, “They were scalped, their brains knocked out; the men used their knives, ripped open women, clubbed little children, knocked them in the head with their rifle butts, beat their brains out, mutilated their bodies in every sense of the word.” By the end of the one-sided battle, as many as 200 Indians, more than half women and children, had been killed and mutilated (scalped).

While the sand Creek Massacre outraged easterners, it seemed to please many people in Colorado Territory. Chivington later appeared on a Denver stage where he regaled delighted audiences with his war stories and displayed 100 Indian scalps, including the pubic hairs of women.

<http://www.pbs.org> (see also Dee Brown, 1970, pp. 82–102).

² In 1941, Charles Portal of the British Air Staff advocated that entire cities and towns should be bombed. Portal claimed that this would quickly bring about the collapse of civilian morale in Germany. Air Marshall Arthur Harris agreed and when he became head of RAF Bomber Command in February 1942, he introduced a policy of area bombing (known in Germany as terror bombing) where entire cities and towns were targeted. One tactic used by the Royal Air Force and the United States Army Air Force was the creation of firestorms. This was achieved by dropping incendiary bombs, filled with highly combustible chemicals such as magnesium, phosphorus, or petroleum jelly (napalm), in clusters over a specific target. After the area caught fire, the air above the bombed area become extremely hot and rose rapidly. Cold air then rushed in at ground level from the outside and people were sucked into the fire.

In 1945, Arthur Harris decided to create a firestorm in the medieval city of Dresden. He considered it a good target as it had not been attacked during the war and was virtually undefended by anti-aircraft guns. The population of the city was now far greater than the normal 650,000 due to the large numbers of refugees fleeing from the advancing Red Army. On the 13th February 1945, 773 Avro Lancasters bombed Dresden. During the next 2 days, the USAAF sent over 527 heavy bombers to follow up the RAF attack. Dresden was nearly totally destroyed. As a result of the firestorm, it was afterwards impossible to count the number of victims. Recent research suggests that 35,000 were killed but some German sources have argued that it was over 100,000.

From <http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWdresden.htm>.

the justification for the massive taking of life is ultimately the saving of lives of the attacking group (e.g., Hiroshima, Dresden), revenge for past injury (e.g., Hutu violence), or a policy decision regarding the greater good for the greater number (e.g., or the systematic elimination of millions of Jews in the Holocaust), and it is done in a series of massacres (Rwanda) or through indirect actions and remotely as in aerial bombing or in an “industrialized” form such as deportation, internment, and systematic execution or exportation of all foodstuffs (e.g., the Irish famine engineered by the English or the forced starvation of six million Ukrainians by Stalinist Russia in 1932, now referred to as the Holodomor (Conquest, 2000; see below).

In the 20th century, the numbers of human victims of mass slaughter burgeoned. According to Gilbert (1994), in 1914, about one million Armenians were massacred or died from brutalities inflicted upon them by the Turks. In addition to 20 million Eastern European war dead, the Nazis systematically eliminated about six million Jews, five million Slavs, Gypsies, and others between 1933 and 1945 (Power, 2002); Stalin masterminded the killing or starvation of up to 30 million “dissenters” in the Soviet Union (Conquest, 2000); Mao Zhe Dung oversaw the killing of up to 20 million of the “bourgeoisie” in China; the Khmer Rouge led by Pol Pot killed 2.5 million “educated people” in Cambodia between 1974 and 1978. In Rwanda in 1994, in a mere 3 months, Hutus killed circa 800,000 people, most of them Tutsi (Dallaire, 2003; Power, 2002). Saddam Hussein orchestrated the killing of the Kurds and gassed others who are still suffering; while in Bosnia, the Serbs under Slobodan Milosevic carried out “ethnic cleansing” of non-Serbs. Other mass slaughters fall short of the legal definition of genocide but share similarities in the psychology of the *genocidaires* (we will use the French term in this paper since English does not have a noun for those who commit genocide), e.g., massacres in El Salvador, Nanking, The Congo, Somalia, Sierra Leone, etc.

Genocide itself is a special case of a more general campaign of persecution and elimination of any identifiable group sanctioned by a superordinate authority. The U.N. resolution of 1948 called for genocide to be defined as Article 2: (U.N. Convention on the prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948): acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such (a) killing members of the group, (b) causing serious bodily harm or mental harm to members of the group, (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life to bring about its destruction in whole or in part, (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, and (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. Our focus in this paper is on components a, b, and to a lesser extent c.

In addition to genocides and “classicide” or political slaughter, we include examples of three “massacres”; the “Rape of Nanking” (Chang, 1997) because of its enormity (250,000 killed), contemporaneous quality (it occurred in 1937), documentation (Chang interviewed perpetrators), and potential comparison to genocide. Another is My Lai, where in 1968, Vietnamese civilians were raped and killed by a Company in the U.S. Army. There is extensive documentation of this event, including the trial of the second in command, Lt. William Calley (Hersh, 1970; Kelman & Hamilton, 1989). Finally, El Mozote, a town in El Salvador where the army raped and slaughtered unarmed women and children (Danner, 1994). Other historical

examples of massacres are too numerous to mention but would include, as a short list: Angola, East Timor, Chechnya, the Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sand Creek (Colorado), Sierra Leone (among others). All of these slaughters occurred during war conditions, all involved unarmed and helpless civilians. While the genocides appear to constitute controlled or “dispassionate” or instrumental violence (serving a political objective), the massacres, although based on military orders, typically involve “overkill” (Dutton & Kerry, 1999; Wolfgang, 1958) or violence beyond that required for military purposes: rape, torture, mutilation, and the killing of harmless civilians, including infants. Finally, mixes of massacre and genocide occur. In Rwanda, a government policy of genocide toward the Tutsi minority was enacted largely through a series of massacres and hence represents a blend of the two forms of political killing.

For genocide, sociopolitical explanations may suffice. In those processes, the “dispassionate” individual killer is only a cog in the machine and has a very circumscribed role, from signing death warrants (e.g., Adolph Eichmann) to pressing a button to open a bomb bay door, or to release poison gas, or under gun point to remove food from starving people. The perpetrator is a specialist who does not usually have to repeatedly engage in the individual infliction of pain, mutilation, and death or confront the horrific consequences in terms of piles of corpses. In massacres, however, the actions of military, regardless of degree of training, become cruel and violent, limited only by the human imagination.

Finally, both genocide and massacres involve international complicity, an active decision by outside countries to disregard the slaughter, a willful ignorance of what is occurring. In nine genocides in the 20th century, no outside party intervened, if at all, until the violence had played itself out. Power (2002) describes the admixture of willful ignorance and disbelief accompanying the Holocaust, the Cambodian genocide, and both the Serbian and Rwandan genocides. Power argues that the world’s powers and the U.N. had current information on the progress of all genocides and constructed a rationale for inaction based on national self-interest. Such behavior appears to go far beyond the failure to detect the harm that has been observed in bystander intervention studies of individuals or small groups (Darley & Latane, 1968, 1970) and to involve political decisions to willfully ignore and remain unconnected from the event and any obligations under international law to intervene (Power, 2002). All massacres reviewed here involved extensive obfuscation by the perpetrators. Genocides were denied and “sanitized” language developed to describe events euphemistically.

In this paper, we will review the following genocides: the Turkish slaughter of Armenians in 1915, the starvation of Ukrainians by Stalin in the 1930s known as the Holodomor, the slaughter of the Serbian Muslims by Serbs in 1994, and the slaughter of Tutsi and moderate Hutus by Hutu in Rwanda in 1994. Other well-known genocides of note include the mass slaughters by Stalin, Mao Zhe Dung, and the Nazis. In addition, we include examples of mass political slaughter, the slaughter of Cambodians by the Khmer Rouge in 1979–1988, and massacres, the rape and massacre of the Chinese by the Japanese Army in Nanking in 1937 (Chang, 1997) and the massacres at My Lai and El Mozote. We assume that most interested readers will be familiar with the Holocaust and in the service of shortening the paper will not reiterate it here. The interested reader is referred to Suedfeld (2001) for a succinct and insightful analysis of the causes of the Holocaust.

In each case, we have extracted key historical elements relevant to the perception of an out-group as threatening, to the decision to take genocidal action, and to the acting out of that decision against that group. We should point out that conflicting accounts exist for virtually all examples set out below, typically one (of denial) by the perpetrator group and one by the victim group. For example, Japan still denies the “Rape of Nanking” described below (see Takemoto & Ohara, 2000). Wherever possible, we have relied on third-party reports by groups such as Human Rights Watch or historians or witnesses from disinterested countries. In some cases (El Mozote, Iraq), forensic evidence supported the victims’ version of events. In other cases (Nanking, Rwanda), rights tribunals have provided corroboration and third-party witnesses existed to bear testimony (see, for example, Dallaire, 2003).

2. Armenia

According to Power (2002), in 1914 Russia declared war on Turkey and invited Armenians living within Turkey to rise up against Ottoman rule. A small minority did so. The majority of Armenians, however, expressed loyalty to Constantinople. When Turkey, ruled by a group called the Young Turks, entered World War I (on the side of the Germans and Austrians) in 1915, they declared that they would target Christian subjects (the Armenians were Christians) as enemies of the state. In January 1915, the leader of the Young Turks, Mehmed Talaat, declared that there was no room for Christians in Turkey and that they should leave. By March, Armenian men serving in the Ottoman army were disarmed. When the allies (Britain, France, and Russia) invaded Turkey on April 25, 1915, Talaat ordered the roundup and execution of 250 leading Armenian intellectuals in Constantinople. Prominent Armenians in other provinces met the same fate. Disarmed Armenians were enlisted as pack animals to transport supplies, churches were desecrated, schools were closed, teachers who refused to convert to Islam were killed, and Armenians were deported to Syria where no facilities existed and many died en route. Many women were raped and killed by their Turkish guards. By proclamation, they had to leave at once and could not take their property. Those actions were justified by the Young Turks as necessary to suppress an Armenian revolt. Talaat excused his generalizing from a few to the entire group as follows:

We have been reproached for making no distinction between innocent Armenians and the guilty, but that was utterly impossible, *in view of the fact that those who were innocent today might be guilty tomorrow* (Power, 2002, p. 8, italics added).

By December 1915, about 8 months after the Turkish slaughter had begun, the *New York Times* reported that about 800,000 Armenians had been killed. By 1916, the number was put at 1 million and was, at that time, unparalleled in modern history.³ The range of estimates on the death toll is from 200,000 (Turkish historians) to 1 million (British historians: Power, 2003, p. 517).

³ *New York Times*, December 15, 1915, Million Armenians Killed or in Exile, p. 3.

3. The Ukrainian terror starvation or Holodomor

Ten paces away and our voices cannot be heard. The only one heard is the Kremlin mountaineer, the destroyer of life and the slayer of peasants.

Osip Mendalstaum, poet who was executed for writing this verse about Stalin.

Although the Ukraine has been free for only a brief period in history when the Russian revolution occurred, the farmers, many of whom were “Cossack-farmers” (Dolot, 1987) and used to independence, were given the opportunity to develop semi-independence in return for the obligation to turn over part of their crop to the government for a fixed price. According to Ulam (1987), there followed a remarkable recovery in the fecundity of the Ukrainian countryside. According to Conquest (1986), however, the Ukrainian farmer (not a true “peasant” in that he owned his modest acreage rather than working land as a tenant) was regarded with suspicion by Marxist zealots for his individual success. The Marxists were largely urban and eventually chose to dogmatically replace the farmer with a proletariat in the country. Their first efforts at forced collectivization were greeted with resistance with farmers choosing to kill livestock rather than turn it completely over to the state. For a time, the Soviets relented then redoubled their efforts to force the farmer into line, lowering the fixed price and increasing the quota demanded by the state. Those measures were enforced at first by tens of thousands of armed fanatical party members who were indoctrinated to view the farmers as “petty capitalists and class enemies” and sent into the countryside, then by police and troops. By 1932, government quotas exceeded production and so a furious Stalin ordered that not only all the harvest be removed but forbade by force of arms the country people from either traveling to find food or importing any. The results were calamitous. According to Conquest (1986), it produced the greatest genocide of the 20th century outnumbering all the war dead on both sides of World War I and eventually reaching approximately 7–10 million in the Ukraine and neighboring Byelorussia. One survivor described it as follows:

“The first deaths from hunger began to occur. . .there was always some ceremony in the village cemetery. One could see strange funeral processions: children pulling homemade handwagons with the bodies of their dead parents in them or the parents carting the bodies of their children. There were no coffins; no burial ceremonies performed by priests. The bodies of the starved were just deposited in a large common grave, one upon the other; that was all there was to it. Individual graves were not allowed, even if someone were still physically able to dig one. . .Looking back top those events now, it seems to me that I lived in come kind of a wicked fantasy world. . .All the events which I witnessed and experienced then and which I am now describing, seem unreal to me because of their cruelty and unspeakable horror” (Dolot, 1987, p. 40).

“To safeguard the 1932 crop against the starving farmers, the Party and government passed several strict laws. . .watchovers were erected in and around the wheat, potato and vegetables fields. . .the same kind of towers that can be seen in prisons. They were manned by guards armed with shotguns. Many a starving farmer who was seen foraging for food near or inside the fields, fell victim to trigger-happy youthful vigilantes and guards” (Dolot, 1987, p. 158).

The Russians went to great pains to keep the extreme human carnage a secret, even in the Soviet Union, though many western intellectuals including H. G. Wells, George Bernard Shaw, and Pulitzer Prize winner Walter Duranty of the *New York Times* knew but chose to look the other way and even to prevaricate, apparently in order to curry favor with Stalin. Others such as Malcolm Muggeridge and George Orwell sounded the alarm but were dismissed as anticommunist. Apparently, even Stalin admitted the numbers in private to Winston Churchill (Conquest, 1986, p. 126). Luciuk (1988) examined secret English government documents that confirm the United Kingdom knew of the “Holodomor” or great hunger. No one wished to risk Stalin’s wrath by raising a protest. As it turns out, removing food from a whole, unarmed population is a much more efficient means of genocide than gas ovens, deportation, firing squads, or even nuclear weapons.

4. Cambodia

In Cambodia, this symbolic aspect of target selection is emphasized. Cambodian Buddhists killed Cambodian Buddhists who were quintessentially like them, except for a manufactured political distinction: to create a “higher” ideal of total political equality, those “educated people” who had participated in an unjust system that had favored them had to be dispatched. All Cambodians with above a Grade 7 education were killed, along with people who wore glasses. Some debate exists over whether Cambodia can be termed a genocide since on the basis of race or ethnicity alone, genocide in Cambodia would have logically extended to in-group slaughter. For present purposes, we will term Cambodia a “systematic political slaughter” as opposed to a true genocide. However, we argue that apart from the basis for the in-group–out-group distinction, the killing in Cambodia was implemented like a genocide.

The rise of the Khmer Rouge intersected with the American war in Viet Nam, intended to prevent a “domino effect” of communism spilling into Cambodia’s neighbor, South Vietnam. U.S. President Richard Nixon expanded this war into Cambodia because North Vietnamese units were taking sanctuary there, ordered carpet bombing, and then an invasion by ground troops. As the U.S. war against communism spilled into Cambodia, a civil war broke out in Cambodia in 1970 between the forces of Lon Nol, the U.S.-backed leader in Cambodia, and the Khmer Rouge, a radical, Maoist-inspired rebel force. In 1975, the victorious Khmer Rouge (KR) entered Phnom Penh, the capital of Cambodia. As early as 1973, the U.S. consul in Cambodia had been notified that villages were being razed by the KR, and this information was relayed to Washington in 1974. In that report, Kenneth Quinn, a U.S. foreign service officer, described the KR’s programs as having “much in common with those of totalitarian regimes in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union” (Power, 2002, p. 96).

Those events were described as “infighting” by the U.S. press. Little was known of the KR or their leader Pol Pot, although reports of genocidal acts began to filter out with Cambodian refugees in Viet Nam and from François Ponchaud, a French Jesuit priest who lived among the Cambodians. Ponchaud reported that the KR took no prisoners, instead killing all soldiers and their entire families too. Cannibalism had become a common practice during the civil

war, as the Cambodians believed (as do some African tribes in the Congo and Burundi; Bergner, 2003; and the Japanese Army; Chang, 1997, p. 88) that eating an enemy's liver gave them more physical strength. Reports of depravities by the KR were met with incredulity, even in Phnom Penh before it fell. When the last foreign journalists left Cambodia, a cloak of secrecy enveloped the country.

Refugee reports were made to Charles Twining of the U.S. embassy in Thailand by refugees at the Cambodia–Thai border. The refugees reported mass executions of people killed mechanically by a blow to the back of the head with a garden hoe. The killers were teenage boys. Children had been starved; Buddhist monks asphyxiated. The KR were killing all ethnic Vietnamese, ethnic Chinese, Muslim Chams, Buddhist monks, and “enemies of the state” (all deemed to be “intellectuals”). Maoism proclaimed that the revolution should proceed with people who were a “blank slate” and that “to keep you is no gain, to kill you is no loss” (Power, 2002, p. 119). This ideology and a clinically paranoid leader drove the genocide. Pol Pot believed that he was surrounded by enemies of the revolution. Anybody who might challenge this view would have been regarded as an enemy of the revolution and in turn dispatched, so there was no countervailing voice to moderate the leader's suspicions of other groups. This consequence of terror characterizes all despotic regimes, making them closed systems (Janis', 1982, concept of groupthink) where dissent to violence is voiced at risk of death (see Section 5).

Estimates of deaths were 800,000 in the first year the KR took power, and a total of about 2.5 million buried in the “killing fields.” Sixteen thousand people had been tortured to death in a prison camp called Tuol Sleng (Power, 2002, pp. 143, 488). One problem that war crimes tribunals face is estimating the number of perpetrators. One former KR official came forward in Paris claiming to have personally helped execute 5000 people with a pickaxe (Power, 2002, p. 120). As with the Nazis who used euphemisms such as “resettlement, removal, or special action” for genocide, the KR used the terms “sweep, sweep out, and discard” (Power, 2002, p. 129). Such euphemistic language served the function of helping the perpetrators dissociate and obfuscated the slaughter for any outsiders who may have heard rumors about this so-called “infighting.” As of 2002, no KR official had admitted any responsibility for the atrocities and Cambodians born after Pol Pot's reign know more about the atrocities from the American movie *The Killing Fields* than through anything learned at home (Power, 2002, p. 489). Pol Pot denied any knowledge of Tuol Sleng and blamed Cambodian deaths on “Vietnamese agents” (Power, 2002, p. 409).

5. Rwanda

A background condition for genocide appears, with some exceptions, to be the presence of a war. In Cambodia, genocide developed from a brutal civil war that killed one million people.

Power (2002, p. 91) argues that “War legitimates such extreme violence that it can make aggrieved or opportunistic citizens feel licensed to target their neighbors.” War also generates an ambient terror of extinction that can be displaced into rage, identifies the target for

crystallizing that rage, and provides the camouflage and informational vacuum for the genocide.

When, in 1962, Belgium withdrew from its colony Rwanda, two tribal groups existed with a history of friction. The majority Hutu were about 6.5 million, the minority Tutsi about one million. The Tutsi were taller, lighter skinned, and had been favored for political posts by the Belgians. When the Belgians left, 30 years of Hutu rule ensued during which the Tutsi were systematically discriminated against and subjected to periodic bouts of killing and “ethnic cleansing” (Human Rights Watch Publications, 1999; Power, 2002, p. 336).

Despite the tribal animosity, Hutu and Tutsi lived together and intermarried, attended the same schools, drank at the same bars. By 1990, the political tensions generated a group of armed Tutsi exiles called the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). In 1993, the Arusha accords were signed by the RPF and the Rwandan Government (Dallaire, 2003, p. 123), stipulating a peace arrangement between Hutu and Tutsi and calling for a U.N. force to keep the peace. Canadian General Romeo Dallaire headed that U.N. force and arrived in Rwanda soon after. For at least a year before his arrival, Hutu extremists had been stockpiling guns, grenades (85 tons), and over a half million machetes. Hutu-dominated newspapers and radio called for an extermination of the minority Tutsi (Power, 2002, pp. 337–340). The Tutsi were depicted as arrogant, privileged immigrants who were “enemies of the people.”

In April, 1994, the governing president of Rwanda was killed in a plane crash. In the ensuing months, 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu (those who believe in peaceful coexistence with the Tutsi) were raped, mutilated, and slaughtered with grenades and machetes. In many cases, they were herded into churches and hacked to death. Davenport and Stam (2004) put the number of Tutsi slaughtered at 500,000 and claim that 300,000 Hutu were slaughtered as well by other Hutus in a killing frenzy that took both political and personal victims. In either case (political or personal/political), the slaughter was primarily genocidal and succeeded in exterminating 77% of the Tutsi population. It could also be described as “ultra genocidal” in that it was extended to those moderate Hutu who believed in living harmoniously with the Tutsi (Dallaire, 2004, speech at UBC, March 2004).

Human Rights Watch (1999) reported that once the killing began, the killers could not stop, and turned to killing suspect Hutu once all local Tutsi were killed. Women, men, and children (the Hutu militia had boys as young as age nine; Dallaire, 2003) took part in the killing and people killed their former neighbors. Dallaire (2003), in his testimony before the ensuing tribunal in Tanzania, reported that Tutsi women had been raped, mutilated, murdered, and had objects inserted in their vaginas and their corpses “posed” in what forensic psychologists would view as the modus operandi of a sexual sadist (Ressler, Burgess, & Douglas, 1992). This “posing” of rape/murder victims also occurred in Nanking (Chang, 1997, p. 94). This behavior raises questions about sadism in general and sexual sadism, generally viewed as trait pathologies by forensic psychology but seeming to appear in both wars and genocides as state-dependent sadism.

There were daily warnings and reports of this genocide made to the U.N. by Dallaire but they were ignored. France, Belgium, and the United States sent troops to Rwanda to extricate their own citizens. All forces refused aid to the beseeching Tutsi survivors.

6. Bosnia

Before 1991, Yugoslavia was comprised of six republics. But when Serb president Slobodan Milosevic began to promote Serb dominance, Slovenia and Croatia seceded. Serb citizens boycotted the vote. A country cobbled together under the 45-year iron-fisted rule of the communist, Marshal Tito, was about to come apart. In Bosnia, the Serbs began a practice of what they called “ethnic cleansing.” Power quotes Holocaust historian Raul Hilberg as saying, “The key to the entire operation from the psychological viewpoint was to never utter the words that would be appropriate to the action. Say nothing, do these things, do not describe them” (Power, 2002, p. 249). Ethnic cleansing initially meant limits on jobs for non-Serb Bosnians and limits to free assembly, travel, and communication. It controlled and limited their use of space (Helsinki Watch, 1992). Now the term was extended to include the systematic, sanctioned elimination of targeted ethnic groups. The hygienic implications of the word “cleansing” gave these actions a salutary spin.

Soon the deportations were accompanied by rape and killing. Some victims were dismembered with chain saws (Power, 2002, p. 254).⁴ Croats and Muslims alike were put in concentration camps and starved to death. In the first 7 months, about 70,000 Bosnians were killed and within a year, 100,000 (Power, 2002, pp. 287, 295). Unlike events in Cambodia, there was extensive and graphic coverage of the violence in the West. Despite worldwide awareness of the atrocities perpetrated in Bosnia, nothing was done. Eventually, a weak U.N. force was put in place in Bosnia to, among other things, protect non-Serbian Bosnians. In 1995, the U.N. force was overrun and 7000 Muslims were slaughtered in Srebrenica - raped and bayoneted, throats cut, and shot (Power, 2002, pp. 412–413). The killings were systematic, men were separated from women: the women were raped then killed.

Eventually, a peace accord was signed in Dayton, Ohio. The Dayton Accord did not stop the violence, however, as it did not order arrests for those perpetrating war crimes. The site for violence then shifted to Kosovo in the south, where the target now was Albanians, 3000 of whom were killed. The motto used by Serb forces was “A massacre a day helps keep NATO away” (Power, 2002, p. 47). North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) eventually bombed Serbia and Serbia retaliated by driving 1.3 million Kosovars from their homes in an act of “ethnic cleansing.” The NATO bombing and subsequent deployment of 60,000 NATO troops eventually brought peace to Bosnia.

7. Military massacres

7.1. *The Rape of Nanking*

Chang (1997) has graphically described the rape and slaughter of Chinese soldiers and civilians occurring during the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. By historical standards, Chang

⁴ It is not known whether the victims were dismembered while alive or dead. Catholic attacks on “infidels” during the Fourth Crusade (1203 and 1204) involved dismembering all limbs and leaving the living victim in a gorge to bleed to death (this took, surprisingly, about 3 days, Phillips, 2003).

views the Rape of Nanking as the largest short-term mass extermination in history (the Romans killed 150,000 during the sack of Carthage, but numbers of victims in Rwanda surpassed even Nanking). While estimates vary, it seems 250,000 dead is the accepted estimate, but the slaughter is infamous for the cruelty with which the victims were dispatched. Chinese men were used for bayonet practice, women were gang raped, sodomized, and had their vaginas crammed with foreign objects (this form of sexual abuse was also reported in the Human Rights Hearings on Rwanda). Men and women were disemboweled. Babies were thrown into the air and impaled on bayonets, cut in half or quartered (this practice is also reported by [Danner, 1994](#), as occurring during the civil war in El Salvador: The Massacre at El Mozote). Although the Japanese government has officially denied that this event occurred (despite a war crimes trial in Tokyo and Nanking in which Japanese officers were found guilty and hanged), Europeans living in Nanking at that time (who were spared) have largely confirmed the carnage ([Chang, 1997](#), p. 187).

The event was precipitated by the surrender of the Chinese army at Nanking in December 1937. According to [Chang \(1997\)](#), an order was issued to “kill all captives” (p. 40). About 500,000 civilians and 90,000 troops were trapped in Nanking and surrendered to 50,000 Japanese troops. The slaughter began with the killing of the Chinese troops, for whom the Japanese had great contempt. That contempt was enhanced by their surrender, which Japanese soldiers were trained to not do. An article of the code of Bushido was to never dishonor one’s lord by avoiding death. The Japanese warrior culture valued suicide over surrender and, of course, highly valued Kamikaze (suicidal mission). The Chinese soldiers were shot en masse. Their bodies were cremated or dumped into the Yangtze River.

The Japanese then started a house-to-house search of Nanking, shooting any civilians they encountered. Evidence for this series of events comes from diaries kept by some Japanese soldiers and by Japanese journalists who were appalled by what was transpiring ([Chang, 1997](#), p. 47). At this point, mass rape began. Every woman available was raped regardless of age. There was a military policy forbidding rape, but according to [Chang \(1997\)](#) it could not overcome centuries old Japanese military practice (although raping enemy females is clearly not exclusive to the Japanese since it happened in Rwanda, El Salvador, Bosnia, Russia, and Germany as well). Chang claims that the Japanese military culture taught that raping virgins made one more powerful in battle (similar to beliefs in the Congo and elsewhere about cannibalism). One of the Japanese soldiers (Shiro Azuma) later wrote to Chang saying, “Perhaps when we were raping her, we looked at her as a woman but when we killed her, we just thought of her as something like a pig” ([Chang, 1997](#), p. 50). The postrape killing included mutilation, insertion of foreign objects into the vagina, disembowelling, and vivisection. Men were sodomized or forced to perform sexual acts with members of their own family ([Chang, 1997](#), p. 95). The degradation of entire families was a common practice of sexual torture. Some family members chose death rather than participate, a choice made easier by the belief that one would be raped then savagely killed immediately afterwards by the sexually aroused soldiers. As was reported in Rwanda, children were killed in front of their parents.

The rape and carnage lasted for 6 weeks. By contrast, during that time the Japanese observed an International Non-killing Zone where Americans and Europeans lived. Some Chinese found refuge there. No non-Chinese were killed or hurt. John Rabe, a German

businessman and member of the Nazi party, saved numerous Chinese and cabled Hitler to rethink his connection with Japan (Chang, 1997, p. 109) and occasionally put himself at risk to save Chinese (Chang, 1997, p. 121). The Japanese exhibited some political control in not killing non-Chinese, even during the 6-week killing spree. Hence, some social control was at work even at the height of the massacre.

Even though the Japanese had been trained to kill civilians (Chang, 1997, p. 57), the newly arrived soldiers who witnessed the torture of civilians were shocked. By the end, that aversion had changed. Chang (1997) interviewed Japanese veterans who reported experiencing a lack of remorse even when torturing helpless civilians (Chang, 1997, p. 59). However, in some cases remorse occurred with a delayed onset. Nagatomi Hakudo, a doctor in Japan, built a shrine of remorse in his waiting room where patients could watch videotapes of his war crime trial (War Crimes trials were held in Tokyo and Nanking) and confession. He said,

“Few know that soldiers impaled babies on bayonets and tossed them still alive into pots of boiling water. They gang raped women from the ages of twelve to eighty and killed them when they no longer satisfied their sexual requirements. I beheaded people, starved them to death, burned them, and buried them alive, over two hundred in all. It is terrible that I could turn into an animal and do these things. There are really no words to explain what I was doing. I was truly a devil” (p. 59).

The U.S. government had cracked the Japanese cipher in 1936 and knew what was transpiring in Nanking but kept it from the U.S. public (Chang, 1997, p. 148; Kahn, 1991). It was years before Pearl Harbor (in 1941) and the U.S. government believed the public outcry would force U.S. involvement in a war they did not yet want.

Chang (1997) views some explanations for the Japanese brutality as specific to Japan; the hierarchical nature of Japanese society coupled with brutalization of the Japanese soldier, as part of training that included exercises to numb men (p. 217), “against the human instinct against killing people who are not attacking” (p. 55). Japanese culture originated as tribal without an embracing concept of humanity. Moral obligations in Japanese society, as in other collective cultural systems (Triandis, 1995), were not universal but local and particularized so they could easily be broken on foreign soil when confronting out-group members (p. 54).

Desensitization was part of Japanese military training. Soldiers were taught how to cut off heads and bayonet living prisoners in training. Initially, recruits had revulsion to these practices (Chang, 1997, pp. 57–58), eventually then became inured and atrocities became banal. This goes some way toward explaining the beheadings and the “killing contests.” It does not explain the tortures or rapes that were not part of training in the Japanese or other military training camps.

Also, according to historian Theodore Cook (Chang, 1997, p. 54), there is no historical precedent in Japanese history for the Rape of Nanking. Such atrocities had not occurred in Japanese civil wars. It may be that ethnocentrism in Japan was extreme, fuelled by the vision of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere with Japan as its leader (Chang, 1997, p. 55), and that the Chinese were viewed as resisting that social order and hence subhuman. Diary reports of Japanese soldiers reflect the belief that Chinese were a subhuman species. However,

being subhuman does not “explain” the furious sadism the Japanese soldiers exhibited; for example, there is no evidence that the Japanese are especially cruel toward animals.

It could be argued that knowledge of human attributes (such as human capacity to feel pain) fuels sadism, for example, in the killing of children in front of their parents requires a knowledge of what would be most painful for a human to witness. It requires an awareness of human family attachment and parental protectiveness. It then turns these universal norms upside down and acts against them to maximize psychological as well as physical pain. Hence, “dehumanization” as an explanation of barbarous acts is called into question by the actions of the soldiers in both Nanking and Rwanda.

7.2. *My Lai*

According to [Kelman and Hamilton \(1989\)](#) and based on descriptions by [Hersh \(1970\)](#), later corroborated at the trial of Lt. William Calley, U.S. Army Charlie Company’s Second Platoon (11th Light Infantry Brigade, American Division) attacked a village in Viet Nam, killing between 128 and 500 unarmed civilians, raping the women, and bayoneting children. ([Hersh, 1970](#), p. 72). A substantial amount of this killing was organized and some occurred spontaneously during “mop-up” operations. The massacre was officially reported as a military victory over the Viet Cong.

[Lifton’s \(1973\)](#) descriptions of My Lai, based on eyewitness reports, suggested that killings were accompanied by a generalized rage and by expressions of anger and revenge towards the victims. [Kelman and Hamilton \(1989\)](#) suggest that rage occurs in the course of the killing as a way of explaining and rationalizing the actions. After the slaughter, the soldiers shared lunch with surviving Vietnamese children who they were killing hours before ([Kelman & Hamilton, 1989](#), p. 9). The authors do not explain why these children would go anywhere near the Americans.

The My Lai operation was planned as a “search and destroy” mission with an objective to root out a Viet Cong battalion. The men in C company were frustrated by an inability to find an elusive enemy and felt that finally they would get into combat ([Kelman & Hamilton, 1989](#), p. 3). The combination of losing men to booby trapped mines and the inability to find the enemy had created a climate of animosity and a hunger for revenge. Hence, some evidence for an elevated baseline level of rage among all soldiers existed. This preexisting state is different from that described for Nanking or El Mozote.

The men in C company were 18–22 years old and had volunteered for the draft. The company commander, Captain Ernest Medina, had given the men orders to expect resistance, burn the village, and to kill the livestock. It was not clear whether an order was given to slaughter the inhabitants. Medina’s second in command, Lt. William Calley, claimed he had heard such an order was given. Medina denied it.

[Hersh \(1970\)](#) described the Platoon entering the village “with guns blazing.” All there were women, children, and old men. The platoon began to ransack the village and kill everyone. Shooting into huts without knowing who was inside. Atrocities occurred spontaneously; rapes, tortures, killings (see also, [Brownmiller, 1975](#), pp. 101–109). According to testimony given later at the trial of Lt. William Calley, the inhabitants were rounded up and executed.

Calley, the only soldier tried in court, had ordered the executions and was found guilty. He had also killed several civilians himself, although so had many other soldiers. Some men refused to carry out Calley's orders to execute civilians. This refusal was significant in court, signifying that the orders were not reasonable (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989, pp. 7–8). A helicopter crew began to attempt to rescue Vietnamese civilians and was ordered to fire at U.S. soldiers if they shot at the civilians (op. cit. pp. 8–9). The Army command knew something had gone wrong and began an instant cover up by reporting the operation as a victory over the Viet Cong. An individual soldier, with knowledge of the incident, began a letter writing campaign that started the subsequent investigation. Kelman and Hamilton's (1989) survey, done in 1971, indicated that about two thirds of Americans felt it was wrong to try Calley. There were two men higher up than Calley at My Lai, one was killed in action, the other was not tried.

Calley had some interpersonal problems; he had failed at school, was only 5 feet 3 inches tall, and was universally hated by his men, who made plans to kill him by "fragging" or the use of a fragmentation grenade. He was described as "hostile" and "nervous" by his men. However, he had no criminal record before or after the war. Calley spent 3 years under house arrest.

7.3. *El Mozote*

In the 1980s, a civil war was fought in El Salvador between guerillas (the People's revolutionary Army) and the government of Alfredo Cristiani (Danner, 1994). As with the Viet Cong, the Salvadoran guerillas proved elusive. Support for the guerillas was fairly high in the general area of Morazan in South Eastern El Salvador, around a tiny town called El Mozote but not within the town itself where the people were essentially born-again Christians. There, people were staunchly anticommunist while the guerilla army was a left wing political group. Up until that time a "dirty war" had been taking place with skirmishes and death squads who killed, mutilated, and raped their victims. Those death squads left signature knife cuts on victims, which signified their connection with the right wing Martinez Brigade. The El Salvadoran Army decided to launch an offensive in Morazan under the direction of a Colonel Domingo Monterossa Barrios and they warned prominent citizens of El Mozote to stock up on provisions and stay inside the town. As the army chased guerillas through the hills of Morazan, some guerillas warned the citizens of El Mozote to flee but believing they had nothing to fear, they decided to stay. The army, however, had begun a procedure of "zone killing" whereby they would make an example to terrorize the guerillas by slaughtering all residents of a geographic area. The general order was to kill all the men who were all suspected of being guerillas. The paranoia became so great that officers even began to suspect one another of being guerillas (Danner, 1993, p. 67). The hard line army officers always referred to the guerillas as a virus, an infection, or a cancer. This justified killing all members of a suspected guerillas' family.

When the Atlacatl Battalion of the Salvadoran Army reached El Mozote in December 1991, they marched all the inhabitants (women, children, and old men) into the center of town, screaming abuse at them. They stripped them of jewelry and then ordered them back

to their houses, planning initially to interrogate them about logistics connections to the guerillas. Then they ordered the men outside and into a church where they shot them all. A few who tried to escape were shot then beheaded. Eventually, they stopped shooting and decapitated all remaining men. They ordered the women and children into an adjacent building and once the men were dead, began raping and killing the women. At last they returned to the crying children and began to shoot, bayonet, and slash them with machetes.

In a rationalization reminiscent of that given by Talaat during the Armenian genocide, one captain ended soldiers balking at the killing the children by arguing that,

If we don't kill them now, they'll just grow up to be guerillas. We have to take care of the job now (Danner, 1994, p. 75, italics added).

He then threw a child into the air and impaled him on a bayonet, then most of the children were killed either by bayoneting or hanging. A few children and women were overlooked and left for dead in some cases they escaped into the jungle and avoided search parties. The women (particularly one named Rufina Amaya) eventually told what had happened.

The story was relayed to the U.S. press and reported after reporters from the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* visited El Salvador. The government denied any atrocities had occurred. In 1992–1993, a U.N.-sponsored investigation, led by the Forensic Anthropology team from the University of Buenos Aires, unearthed skeletons of women and children on the El Mozote site. It was the largest mass slaughter in Central American history. Col. Monterossa at first denied the killing when asked by U.S. Army Intelligence (Danner, 1994, p. 203); subsequently, he claimed the Salvadoran Army was under attack in the village of El Mozote. Of course, the subsequent investigation by the U.N. proved this story to be a lie. Exhumation of corpses revealed 143 remains of which 132 were children and one fetus. On another occasion, Monterossa admitted a *limpieza* (cleaning out) had occurred (Danner, 1994, p. 152). A subsequent investigation listed names of 794 dead. The ensuing peace accord, signed in 1992, contained an agreement that the El Salvadoran Army be purged of “known human rights violators” (Danner, 1994, p. 158). A subsequent Truth Commission investigation established that at least 500 people were killed by at least 24 different guns (not all planned exhumations were completed). Final estimates put the total killed at about 733–926 people in 1 day (Danner, 1994, p. 189).

8. The social structure of genocide

Suedfeld (2001) suggests that case studies provide important historical information on particular genocides, comparative studies on the common factors present in all genocides. In this paper, we focus more on the latter but acknowledge that individual differences exist. For example, with the Holocaust, the attack was made on a group that had been loyal, patriotic, and productive members of German society and was intended to eliminate this group not only from Germany, but from the world (Suedfeld, 2001, p. 54). In Cambodia, although other ethnic groups were attacked, the main killing was by Cambodians on

Cambodians based on a peculiar notion of class membership. In most cases though, a target group is selected for reasons having to do with historical animosity. Furthermore, we will argue below that even general theories of genocide are not sufficient to account for massacres and atrocities.

One quantitative study has attempted to explore the variation of homicidal activity that exists within a genocide (Fein, 1979). This work investigated why certain countries under the Third Reich were subjected to a large amount of killing (e.g., Poland and Slovakia), while others experienced comparatively little (e.g., Rumania and Bulgaria). Using many sources of information, Fein (1979) employed cross-tabulation and regression analysis to show which factors explained the variation in Jewish victimization. From her analysis, Fein concluded that prewar anti-Semitism, German control, state complicity with German activity, and Jewish segregation from the rest of society increased the magnitude of victimization. The number of victims was decreased by early warning of impending German activity and the degree of mass as well as elite resistance to Jewish persecution.

The genodynamics project at the University of Maryland (Davenport & Stam, 2004) is attempting to test political theories about genocide based on “rationalist political models of action. For example, as cited by Davenport and Stam (2004), there are structuralist factors in genocides. In Rwanda, the Hutu government’s propaganda about the forthcoming confrontation with the RPF and suggested that Hutu would be killed by the RPF if and when it took power increased fear and rage toward the Tutsi. This inciting propaganda was compatible with Hutu socialization about a continuous pattern of Tutsi domination and violence that had extended over generations (e.g., Gourevitch, 1998; Human Rights Watch, 1999; Mamdani, 2001). There was regional variation within Rwanda, which was directly relevant to the likelihood of ethnic violence. For example, there was a history of strong Hutu political power within the north from which the leadership during the Second Republic emerged to govern the country from 1973 to 1994. Within that area, the focal point for numerous Tutsi military incursions, there was also a long history of anti-Tutsi persecution. In contrast, the center of the country was generally associated with a more conciliatory Hutu position. “Hutu Power” organizations were the most extreme anti-Tutsi groups. They were most closely associated with the ruling Hutu party and had therefore the most to lose politically if the Tutsi rebel army returned to power. Those organizations drove the genocide (Gourevitch, 1998; Human Rights Watch, 1999). Mamdani (2001) described how members of Hutu Power and/or the militias would show up within a cell, bring all nonmoderate Hutus together in one location, inform them who was to be killed, eliminate any resistance within this crowd by killing any dissidents, and then, as a group, eliminate those targeted. After the killing, the original political group would move on to the next location. Hence, their sociopolitical view attempts to locate genocidal acts within a geopolitical structure.

Davenport and Stam (2004) also argue that in a rural, peasant impoverished economy, survival becomes a prime motive. Such desperation enhances the ability of leaders to generate compliance with genocidal commands. In Rwanda, obedience to those commands was framed in terms of communal labor obligations. The killing was euphemized as “doing the work,” and weapons as “the tools” (Human Rights Watch, 1999). In psychological terms, the

subjective perception of the Tutsi and the actions against them were transformed by social appeals and linguistic dissociation.

Rationalist political models provide a blueprint of influence showing the spread of animosity and eventually killing. However, they cannot explain many aspects of genocidal aggression, such as why the aggression is “overkill” (more severe than required to attain genocide or subjugate the out-group) or why rape is a universal component of genocide (e.g., Rwanda, Bosnia, El Mozote, My Lai). Such models may attempt to explain why some groups are “targeted” or are even seen as necessary for extermination, but they do not elucidate the causes of brutality.

9. Preconditions for genocide and the selection of a target group

Staub (1999, 2000) sees the evolution of “evil” (extreme human destructiveness that is not commensurate with instigating conditions) in a society as starting with the “frustration of basic human needs and the development of destructive modes of need fulfillment” (Staub, 1999, p. 181). Basic human needs include security, positive identity, effectiveness and control over essentials, connections to others and autonomy, and an understanding of the world and our place in it. The frustration of these needs begins a search for a scapegoat, in the form of a target group that can be blamed for the dissatisfaction.

What Waller (2002) calls “our ancestral shadow” is the essential tribalism that sociobiology argues is part of the human condition. In the case of tribalism, ethnic, or religious difference, the target minority is often clearly visible or made so through official identification (e.g., badges, tattoos, or identity cards). Societies whose culture officially emphasizes differences among groups, e.g., Christian versus Jew (rather than merely German), Jew versus Arab (rather than merely Israeli or Semite), facilitate this process. Even relatively transitory or ephemeral characteristics can be identified and recruited to the task merely by promoting xenophobia, a basic human reaction experienced from infancy grounded in sociobiology (Dawkins, 1976; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). In Cambodia, the target group was designated as “educated people” (defined as anyone above Grade 7 or those who wore glasses) who had “benefited” from a bourgeois existence. In Ukraine, it was those peasants who owned “prosperous” farms, who in actuality were no different from the less prosperous in landholdings and livestock, that were initially identified as enemies of the revolution, but eventually everyone was victimized as millions starved. Some writers argue that the Russian oligarchy’s ethnocentricity that cast aspersions on Ukrainians played a part in the genocide (Conquest, 1986; Dolot, 1987).

In Staub’s (1999) model, the frustration of basic needs (e.g., material deprivation, political chaos, realistic conflict) constitutes an instigating condition for destructive process; the satisfaction of a basic need in a way that interferes with the satisfaction of other basic needs. This produces heightened in-group identification, particularly among authoritarian people who seek a strong leader, perception of out-group threat, and a destructive ideology. The latter presents an exclusionary world vision and is called, in extremis, an “ideology of antagonism.”

When subordinate groups demand more, they threaten the basic need satisfaction of the dominant group whose “legitimizing ideology” is threatened and who then react with increasingly harsh acts of repression and aggression. Staub (1999) argues that two types of out-group stereotyping exist. The lesser is devaluation of the out-group. The more intense form specifically sees the out-group as having achieved gains through prior injustice. (Hitler saw the Jews this way and the Hutu extremists portrayed the Tutsi in this way, (note Davenport & Stam’s, 2004, description of Rwanda).

Once initiated, violence generates an evolution in perpetrators; the personality of individuals, social norms, institutions, and culture all change in a way that makes greater violence easier and more likely (Staub, 1999, p. 182; Waller, 2002, p. 134). The usual moral principles that prohibit violence and protect people are replaced by “higher” values protecting purity, goodness, and well-being of the in-group and creating a better society by destroying the victims. A utopian vision is offered that excludes some people and justifies the exclusion in the service of the vision. A progressive restructuring of group norms occurs in line with this ideological shift. Behavior towards the victims that would previously have been considered inconceivable now becomes acceptable and “normal.” Eventually, killing the victims becomes the “right” thing to do. This process can be slow (in Turkey, Armenians had been persecuted for a long time before the genocide) or fast (in Rwanda, Hutu and Tutsi were interconnected only a few months before the carnage, although a long history of tribal animosity existed). As the evolution progresses, the number of perpetrators spreads and the selected target group increases the range of its membership acceptable for purging. In the end, there is what Staub (1999) calls a “reversal of morality” (again, see Davenport & Stam’s, 2004, description).

Janis (1982) notion of “groupthink” comes to mind from this analysis. Janis examined what he defined as “a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when members’ strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.” Although Janis was studying foreign policy decisions, he found that groupthink occurred when there was a highly cohesive group that was insulated from independent judgments, a perceived threat, and an active leader who promotes their own solution. At the societal level, that leader quickly generates a support group. Groups engaging in groupthink have an illusion of invulnerability that leads to excessive optimism and risk taking,⁵ a collective rationalizing of warnings that might temper a position, an unquestioned belief in a group’s moral superiority, negative stereotypes of an out-group making negotiation unfeasible, direct pressure on dissenters from group ideology, self-censorship of deviation from an apparent consensus, a shared illusion of unanimity, and the emergence of self-appointed “mind guards” to protect group from adverse information. Janis proposed groupthink as a small group dynamic yet the collective shifts in perceptions towards target groups’ goals occurring in Germany or Rwanda are strongly reminiscent of groupthink.

⁵ Nordhaus (2003) pointed out how every American war since the civil war had cost estimates by the U.S. Congress that were too low by a factor of 15 (<http://www.nthposition.com>).

10. Selection of a target group

Ghiglieri (1999) views genocide from a sociobiological perspective. This perspective speaks not only to the choice of target groups but to the origins of tribalism; that when a social group grows too large for men to recognize each other, men then feel impelled to join smaller groups, in which they can still belong and recognize the others individually as allies. This, in sociobiological terms, is the origin of ethnocentrism and xenophobia; the out-group originally was those we could not recognize. However, one can join a small group without killing a larger one and in pluralistic societies in-groups coexist peaceably with out-groups.

The forces that shape selection of a target group appear to be both political and psychological. In Serbia, religious and ethnic divisions had existed for some time among the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. Those preexisting divisions became exacerbated when conditions developed for Yugoslavia to disintegrate. In Rwanda, hatred appears to have existed for centuries between the Hutu and Tutsi because of precolonial tribal wars sustained in the memories of the next generation and reinforced by intergroup inequities during Belgian colonization. The Hutu viewed the Tutsi as interlopers who were unfairly favored by the ruling Belgians. Smoldering resentment surfaced as soon as the Belgians left. Typically, there is an ethnic or religious distinction that comes to define a target group, yet ethnic and religious divisions are tolerated worldwide, most often when a superordinate definition provides universal membership (e.g., we are all subservient to a colonizing power, Catholics, Moslems, Communists, Yugoslavs, etc.).

In the case of Cambodia, while ethnic division existed, they were not the essential basis of targeting. Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge came to define “educated people” as a threat who would side with the West (even though Pol Pot himself had a PhD from the Sorbonne, perhaps he took his cue from the French revolution that advocated the elimination of the *bourgeoisie*). His definition of educated was extremely loose but served his political purpose. Hence, in some cases realistic historical conflict provides the germ for the out-group threat (Armenia, Rwanda, and Bosnia), in others (like Cambodia) it is completely manufactured on ideological grounds. It is possible that when clearly defined out-groups do not exist, they have to be invented. Out-groups serve as a kind of lightning rod for the collective frustration rage that builds at a societal level fuelled by need frustration and directed by rhetoric.

10.1. *Inculcation of fear*

Xenophobia is especially potent when a threat is identified. Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif (1961) and Tajfel and Turner (1986) have illustrated how easy it is to produce the differentiation, denigration, discrimination, and hostility necessary as a first step. Simmel (1950), Boyanowsky and Allen (1973), and Pepitone and Kleiner (1957) have shown how in-group self-identity, in combination with threat of censure and in-group conformity processes, reinforces and maintains the distinction. To remain members of the in-group, individuals move away physically and attitudinally from the identified out-group. Perceived threat (real or concocted) inspires the requisite social polarization, initial avoidance, and eventual hostility. This of course was the central motive of Orwell’s (1948) classic’s “1984” where an illusory enemy was fought in battles shown on television in all public spaces on a 24-hour basis.

These observations question whether racial/ethnic conflict is either necessary or sufficient for pogroms or genocide. Historically, the answer seems to be that it increases the likelihood but is neither sufficient nor necessary (e.g., Cambodia). Why then do groups sometimes define others as intolerably different and seek to end the intolerable situation by eradication of the out-group? For whatever reasons, the process is furthered by defining the out-group so that the entire out-group is perceived as threatening. Sometimes, this occurs through generalizing the actions of a few out-group members to the entire group. A group of Armenians had sided with the Russians against the Turks; a group of Tutsis had formed a revolutionary party; Jews in pre-WW2 Germany were seen as part of an exclusive Zionist conspiracy that controlled an inordinate amount of financial resources and as incompatible with a national goal of “racial purity” set by the Nazis; a small group of the Kurds in Iraq had sided with Iran against Iraq. As the perception of threat spreads to encompass the entire group, all members even children are viewed now as probable future enemies and hence as threatening. In the Nanking massacre, the “threat” was initially the sheer number of those captured, which seems to have triggered the mass slaughter (Chang, 1997, p. 41).

It appears that a common perception of *genocidaires* is that their target group is virus- or cancer-like. The notion of the threat spreading is common to these views, justifying extermination of the currently innocent. At the Human Rights Tribunal for abuses in Rwanda, one Hutu woman justified her killing Tutsi children by portraying it as a humanitarian act, saying that she was sparing them the impossibility of living without parents.

10.2. A decision is made to eliminate the out-group

Fear produces tendencies to fight or flee. If groups feel entitled to their land or feel the capacity to overpower the target group, a policy of aggression is more likely. The aversive out-group is viewed as controllable (Bandura, 1979). So long as they exist, they remain a threat; hence, the surest method of control is elimination. This is followed by planning on how best to implement this goal. How then, once a group has been targeted, isolated psychologically, and a threat or injustice attributed to them, how is the killing initiated and sustained? Official sanction and exhortation gives the initiative to grievance, disinhibition, and personal predilection to implement violence. How this personal predilection plays out generates, in some cases, extreme aggression in persons who had little or no history of aggression prior to the social conflict context. According to Staub (1996, 1999), evidence suggests that leaders in genocidal nations (Germany, Rwanda) have attitudes shaped by the culture but in an extreme form.

Le Bon (1895) in his classic book on mob psychology had also hypothesized that the leader was chosen in the situation because he was somewhat more extreme than the rest of the group. As they generate more influence, others come to adopt these anti-out-group attitudes as they become popular in order to belong to an identity affirming group and to generate status within the group. These aspects of conformity are more pronounced with authoritarian followers who prefer a strong leader and the stability of position within an in-group. At the same time, desensitization to the out-group increases, creating a situation where the potential for mass slaughter is raised. Staub’s view is that perpetrators evolve with the commission of evil acts making the commission of further evil acts more likely. Indeed, Staub makes as a defining

quality of evil “the repetition or persistence of greatly harmful acts” (Staub, 1996, p. 180). Staub sees the evil he describes as arising out of extreme forms of ordinary psychological processes and not requiring an explanation from psychopathology. The evolution in killing was evidenced in Nanking and Rwanda. Certainly Staub explains the preconditions for mass violence but not how or why it takes such a sadistic form.

11. Societal conditions shaping mass violence

Apart from the frustration of basic needs described by Staub (1999, 2000), societies clearly differ in the amount of social regulation they generate. One can conceive of a continuum of societies with totalitarian arrangements at one end (e.g., Nazi Germany, Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, Stalinist Russia, China under Mao Zhe Dung, etc.) and “anomic” states at the other (Rwanda). Democratic states with established legal systems would exist in the middle of such a continuum.

In totalitarian societies, government military or paramilitary militia under direct state control do the killing. (In Germany, America, and Ukraine, there were attacks by citizens on the target groups but the preponderant violence was government orchestrated.) The genocide is “dispassionate,” systematic, efficient, and controlled. It is directed toward target groups who were clearly politically selected. The Nazi genocide of the Jews represents an example; it used technology, trains, and gas chambers, crematoria, hugely repressive control.⁶ The sadists were exceptions, such as Josef Mengele (“Dr. Auschwitz”; Lifton, 1986, p. 337),⁷ Eichmann was more typical of the efficient Nazi killing apparatus. Eichmann who “only followed orders” was never directly involved in killing but signed death papers for millions of Jews. Eichmann was also interviewed by Jewish psychiatrists prior to his trial in Jerusalem. He was found to be sane leading to Hanna Arendt’s comments on the “banality of evil” (Arendt, 1964). No prewar evidence for sadism could be adduced from Mengele’s life either (he was an “unremarkable” medical student interested in physical anthropology and genetics; Lifton, 1986, p. 338), although it appeared in his behavior at Auschwitz. Arendt (1964) claimed that the Nazis “were not sadists or killers by nature; on the contrary, a systematic effort was made to weed out those who derived physical pleasure from what they did” (p. 105). It is possible that they missed Mengele because he was adept at concealing “physical pleasure.”⁸

Similarly, the killing in Cambodia is described as “mechanical.” Victims were struck in the back of the head by a garden hoe, ostensibly to save bullets. Both the Nazis and the KR used

⁶ Goldhagen’s (1994) book *Hitler’s Willing Executioners* touched off a historical debate about the degree of complicity amongst nonmilitary in the Holocaust (cf. Browning, 1998).

⁷ Mengele worked overtime at his “job” of deciding which Jews would live or die by pronouncing “links...Rechts” (“Left...Right”) as each approached his position on a ramp. He was described by survivors as appearing to enjoy his work. “Mengele’s studied detachment could be interrupted by outbreaks of rage and violence, especially when encountering resistance to his sense of Auschwitz rules” (p. 343) such as when a victim resisted being directed to live after their family had been directed to die. Mengele would kill directly (with phenol injections) when the system became inefficient (Lifton, 1986, p. 347). There were also reports of him shooting prisoners and of having thrown newborn babies into crematoria.

⁸ Goldhagen (1994) argues that there were “street killings” of Jews in Germany and that “ordinary German” harbored a longstanding hatred of Jews.

euphemized language to describe the process of systematic elimination of a large group of people; “sweep out, discard” were the words used by the KR (cf. the Nazi terms “special action, resettlement”). The Nazi “extermination camps” included Auschwitz, the famous “interrogation camp” of the KR was Tuol Sleng. Found at Tuol Sleng was a set of instructions for inmates. It included rules such as “during the bastinado (beating to the soles of the feet) or the electrification you must not cry loudly.” The killing form of totalitarian regimes is predominantly dispassionate (although a minority of killings in Cambodia occurred through torture and in Ukraine through torture and execution). State ordered genocide lacks the preponderant savagery of massacres within anomic conditions although both dehumanize victims.

12. Military massacres

While negative out-group perception may speak to the explanation of eradication, it does not explain the common “overkill” practices (see [Dutton & Kerry, 1999](#)) in massacres/genocides of raping or torturing or the extreme brutality in killing described above (rape, dismemberment, killing children in front of their parents, etc.). A collective sadism emerges in many massacres/genocides that goes beyond mere extermination and has not been explained by previous work on genocide (e.g., [Staub, 1996, 1999](#)). [Le Bon \(1895\)](#) described men as descending to the primal level in mobs, suggesting a Hobbesian view of the natural state of man as being a state of war. “By the very fact that he forms part of an organized group, a man descends several rungs down the ladder of civilization. Isolated, he may be a cultivated individual, in a crowd, he is a barbarian—that is, a creature acting by instinct” (p. 15).

[Fromm \(1973\)](#) called sadism “the conversion of impotence into the experience of omnipotence” (p. 323). He argued that,

The core of sadism, common to all its’ manifestations, is the passion to have absolute and unrestricted control over a living being. . . . To force someone to endure pain or humiliation without being able to defend himself is one of the manifestations of absolute control. . . . The experience of absolute control over another being, of omnipotence. . . creates the illusion of transcending the limitations of human existence, particularly for one whose real life is deprived of productivity and joy (pp. 322–323).

In a massacre, one group generally has an extreme power advantage over another group whom they perceive a putative enemies. [Zimbardo, Haney, and Banks \(1972\)](#) described this as the pathology of the situation and capable of eliciting abusive behavior from normally well-behaved people.

Another set of general conditions potentiating massacre includes a leader or small cadre of leaders who are extremely prejudiced against the target group and capable through the hierarchical form of social structure to enforce compliance with execution of their exclusionary program. The decision to eradicate the target group originates with this hegemony that is able through coercion, obedience to authority, fear-mongering, using an appeal to tribal membership, xenophobia, or past inequities (the landowners in China and Ukraine) to generate compliance in others. In El Mozote, soldiers balked at killing children ([Danner, 1993](#), p. 88). A

Major “pushed into the group of children, seized a little boy, threw him into the air and impaled him as he fell. That put an end to that discussion” (Danner, 1993, p. 88). Both Freud (1921) and Redl (1942) described leaders as having no emotional connections to anyone but themselves and hence as capable of executing the “unconflicted act” that generated “infectious” copying in followers. After this initial act at El Mozote, other soldiers slaughtered children. Zimbardo (1969) describes a similar initial reluctance to engage in taboo behaviors followed by rapid and escalating participation (see below).

The threat posed by the out-group provides the initial rationalization for violence. Staub (1999) argues that a two tiered form of targeting exists. Level one involves devaluation of the out-group, level two involves the specific perception that the out-group is morally inferior and has gained unjustly because of that trait. This latter perception was true of the Nazi view of the Jews, the Marxist view of the Ukrainian farmer, the Hutu view of the Tutsi, and the Japanese view of the Chinese (Chang, 1997). In both Germany and Japan, a desire for national social dominance existed (Chang, 1997; Goldhagen, 1994).

Japan was very much a totalitarian regime prior to World War II, where the Emperor was treated as godlike and Japanese military was run by an oligarchic clique (Chang, 1997, p. 37). Japanese treatment of POW's was especially cruel (one in three died compared to 1 in 25 in Nazi POW camps). The Nanking massacre seemed more to represent an over controlled culture losing control for a short term (6 weeks was the time frame for the killing spree).⁹

In all military massacres, an order to kill initiated the violence (there was some resistance at El Mozote and some ambiguity at My Lai) but “overkill” violence followed the order. Obedience is paramount in military institutions, disobedience can lead to court-martial. In marginal situations, obedience may triumph. Military socialization occurs despite background social order. However, in either totalitarian or democratic states, military socialization can generate killing.

Military massacres have a different *modus operandi* than controlled state-directed killing. In the former, rage can develop as a response to a military command to kill. (through a combination of a dehumanized target and the action of killing itself generating arousal and anger). Hence, the killing can be rageful and sadistic. From testimony of perpetrators in Nanking and My Lai, there seemed to be a sense that one could do anything with impunity. In My Lai, and possibly El Mozote, a small minority demurred from killing. In Rwanda, the genocide took the form of a series of massacres.

⁹ There was some breakdown in the chain of command at Nanking, when the commander (General Matsui) became ill; (Chang, 1997, p. 38). Military massacres (My Lai, El Mozote) appear to occur despite background social order. My Lai occurred when the United States was a democracy (March 1968) that tolerated dissent. In response to a description of the My Lai situation (your commanding officer orders you to shoot unarmed civilians), Kelman and Hamilton (1989) found that survey samples ($n=400$) of U.S. citizens said that most people believed 62% of others would obey the order but only 34% believed that they personally would do so. There was some variation by education, gender, and geographic location (less educated people were more obedient). There were groups of people who believed the army should have shot civilians and that they themselves would do so. These people tended to see Calley as not responsible. This group was more likely to agree with trying foreign officers for war crimes than American officers for the war crimes. They were high on authoritarianism, obedient to in group norms. Another group believed that no one should shoot under illegal orders. They saw Calley as responsible. They were less likely to have a double standard about war crimes as a function of whether their group or a foreign nation committed them (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989, p. 223).

13. The forensics of war

Higher cortical functioning does not completely disappear in massacres. Indeed, on close inspection, the actions of the military, especially in Nanking and the massacres in Rwanda, seem designed to violate universal taboos—e.g., the slaying of family members in front of other family members or the commanding of family members to have sex with each other. Staub (1999) has termed this a “reversal of morality.” If a forensic examination was conducted on these perpetrators, it would indicate the awareness of the humanity of the victims, the status of a family, and the extreme humiliation such actions would cause. It is this for reason that perpetrator reports of the victims as not human must be balanced against a forensic construction of what they had to know in order to behave as the did.

It is apparent that the actions of brutal rape, torture, and murder that occurred in Rwanda, Bosnia, and all military massacres are similar to those committed by sexual sadists who serially kill (Ressler et al., 1992; Ressler, Burgess, & Douglas et al., 1986). Indeed, Ressler, Burgess, and Hartman et al. (1986) describe “the ultimate expression of the murderers perversion being the (postmortem) mutilation of the victim” (p. 273) and identify elevated rates of prior sexual abuse victimization among eventual perpetrators as a causal factor in murder mutilation. Brownmiller (1975) compared actions described under the testimony of a U.S. Army soldier about sexually mutilating a Vietnamese woman to those of Albert DeSalvo, the “Boston Strangler” (p. 109). She found no difference.

Through use of “crime scene analysis,” the FBI’s Behavioral Science Unit has established different categories of sexual killers, typically differentiated into “organized” and “disorganized.” The former is psychopathic and emotionless, the latter is typically considered psychotic. The latter tends to position the dead body and to insert foreign objects into the vagina. Both practices were reported at Rwanda and Nanking. The psychiatric diagnosis given to such perpetrators is sexual sadist, sadistic personality disorder, or antisocial personality disorder. However, the killers in military cases were following orders to dispose of the “enemy” and took that order as license to wreck havoc on the enemy. Also, the sexual killers in these two locations had immediately prior sex with living women, more consistent with the profile of an “organized” killer.

As described above, murderers who mutilate the victim’s body were found to be more likely to have been sexually abused (Ressler et al., 1986). Of course, we know nothing of the backgrounds of *genocidaires* in Rwanda or Nanking. However, the high level of participation in the killing and its public nature suggests that situational rather than predispositional factors explain the actions. Sexual killers often harbor beliefs about their target population that are similar to the intense form of out-group stereotyping described by Staub. Serial rapists often view woman as “whores” or even target only prostitutes (Marshall & Kennedy, 2003). It appears that their own sexual urges are viewed as abhorrent and projected onto the victims.

In normal society, we view “lust killers” who mutilate their victims as psychotic (Hickey, 2002, p. 17) (in the sense that they live within a sadistic fantasy that captures their reality), yet the same actions committed during mass social violence appear to be committed by men who have no prior signs of psychosis but function well as soldiers. Prior to their sadistic outbursts, they held a rank in an army requiring discipline and surveillance of one’s private life (e.g.,

Japan, United States, El Salvador) or lived, as far as we know, unremarkable lives (Rwanda). Many returned to normal social functioning after the orgy of violence (e.g., Nagatomi Hakudo, the Japanese doctor, and Lt. William Calley) or even after their “days work” (Hersh, 1970; Lifton, 1973). Although some serial sexual killers appeared “normal” (e.g., Wayne Gacey, Ted Bundy, *inter alia*), they lived lives that did not bear the same scrutiny as members of the military. The question remains whether the situation provokes such horrific excesses or merely allows their potentiation.

The forensic model applied to “lust killers,” an especially terrifying form of individual serial murderer, is one of acting out an arousing and repetitive fantasy. Hickey (2002) argues that the urge to kill is fueled by,

...well developed fantasies that allow the offender to vicariously gain control over others. Fantasy for the lust killer is much more than an escape, it becomes the focal behavior. Even though the killer is able to maintain contact with reality, the world of fantasy becomes as addictive as an escape into drugs (p. 70).

Hickey also describes “spree killers” who resemble military killers in that the killing is confined to a short span of time. However, Hickey reports that the forensic *modus operandi* of spree killers does not include sexual attacks (Hickey, 2002, p. 176) whereas rape is commonplace in military massacres. The problem with all forensic explanations is that soldiers who commit massacres behave normally up to the point of the massacre. There is no evidence that, as with lust killers or spree killers, they have been harboring and are motivated by individual fantasies.

14. Military rape

Military rape is especially problematic, it serves no military purpose, soldiers are not trained to rape, and yet it is commonplace. It is sometimes argued that it serves as a terrorist threat but it is typically covered up by perpetrators reducing its threat value (Brownmiller, 1975; Chang, 1997). Rape occurred in Rwanda, Serbia, and Nanking probably in El Mozote and My Lai. Brownmiller (1975) chronicles the universality of rape in war and massacre. In her words, “rape is the quintessential act by which a male demonstrates to a female that she is conquered” (p. 49) and describes rapes of Scottish women by the conquering British, mob rapes during the Kristallnacht attacks on Jew in 1938, rapes (in front of their parents) of Jewish girls during the invasion of Poland and Russia (similar to Chang’s, 1997, descriptions of Nanking), and mob rapes of Vietnamese women by the U.S. soldiers. U.S., Japanese, and German military law (in the German case it was “race defilement”—contaminating Aryan blood; Brownmiller, 1975, p. 51) prohibited rape yet its occurrence was commonplace. According to Brownmiller (1975, p. 530), captured German documents presented at the Nuremberg war crimes tribunal in 1946 corroborate the routine use of rape as a weapon of terror. German, Japanese, and Rwandan rapists dismembered and killed their victims afterwards.

Ghiglieri (1999) posits a sociobiological motive of displacing genetic transmission of the enemy group but raped women are routinely killed after the rape. The killing makes displacement unnecessary, and if soldiers were sociobiologically motivated, they would protect women they had raped in order to maximize their own contribution to the gene pool. It seems that sociobiology must do more than select actions with apparent function and then claim genetic advantage for these actions while ignoring proximal actions with no genetic advantage.

It is common to describe victims as “dehumanized” in these situations, yet no perpetrator group had sexual practices involving sex with nonhumans. However, outside the pathology of serial killers such as Jeffrey Dahmer, Eh Gein, and Edmund Kemper (Hickey, 2002), the mutilation and dismemberment of woman victims is hard to explain if the victim is viewed as human. The raping of family members in front of their family suggests that knowledge of a human social taboo against family sex is part of the consciousness of the rapist. Its function is to generate a human emotion, humiliation. Rape in military situations seems to fulfill an ultimate expression of sexualized power.

15. Transitional explanations for atrocities

Since atrocities are perpetrated by soldiers or (in Rwanda) civilians with no known prior history or extreme violence, some sort of transitional process seems to occur where the perpetrator is altered by the situational conditions into a different sort of person. Several theories have attempted to explain this transformation.

Lifton (1979) argues that killing can represent a form experiential transcendence whereby the killer comes to feel immortal. This feeling occurs with the first killing but requires a “fix” (similar to heroin addiction) of escalating violence to sustain the same subjective state. Embracing extreme ideologies can also serve as an antidote for death terror, suggesting that both attitudes conducive to killing and the killing itself may have a common motive. The action aspect, however, requires rapidly increasing expressions of violence.

Staub argues that once initiated, violence generates an evolution in the personality of perpetrators, especially with regard to normative behavior and perceptions of the victim. Empathy disappears and violence becomes incrementally acceptable. Mawson (1987) has developed a theory to deal with transient criminality. He reviews evidence that under conditions of significant stress, such as found in natural disasters and combat, there occur the following changes: “a partial loss of identity (or weakening of ego boundaries) and a sense of being depersonalized; a decline in self-esteem; alterations in memory and perception; a partial loss of other abstract standards including cultural, moral, and legal rules; and a general decline in intellectual functioning, for example, loss of concentration, decline in problem-solving ability, etc.” (p. 61). In Mawson’s model, combat stress, for example, produces chronic increases in sympathetic arousal, which in turn produces stimulation-seeking behavior searching for familiarity, a recapitulation of the attachment activation system (Bowlby, 1969, 1973). In combat, since no familiarity is to be found, further increases in sympathetic arousal are generated. At this second step arousal, the individuals’ “cognitive map” begins to disintegrate;

more patterned, abstract, differentiated processes situating the individual in a complex of attachment memories, normative obligations, and familiar people and places disperse. Instead of seeking the familiar people and places disperse (to soothe the stress), the combatants turn their stimulus-seeking activities to the intense and the criminal (to fulfill the need for stimulation). This generates an increased likelihood of impulsive, potentially injurious actions. Internalized moral standards disintegrate and stimulus seeking self-generates in an upward spiral.

In a similar vein, Dutton and Yamini (1995) discuss “deconstructed thinking,” a concept developed by Baumeister (1990) to explain suicides and in which higher senses of social meaning are lost in a devolving focus on concrete actions and a loss of higher meaning associations. Dutton and Yamini (1995) applied the concept to case studies of matricide. In such cases, the killers who commit an ultimate taboo act of killing their mothers, had no prior criminal history, and appeared to undergo a transitory alteration of consciousness. Both Mawson’s and Baumeister’s models suggest a psychological transition away from norm-regulated behavior and meaningful thought to impulsive, aggressive behavior, and focused concrete thought. The stress of combat, the fear of violence, and orders to kill all combine to increase the likelihood of such transitory actions.

16. The shaping of savagery: long-term transition

There are two kinds of transitions occurring in genocide and massacre: long term and instant. The long-term transitions involve shaping through training a normally socialized and nonviolent person to kill. This process requires desensitization against the impact of killing (see Waller, 2002). In Rwanda, desensitization occurred through brutalizing boys who were to be militia by forcing them to kill their own villagers. This practice desensitized the boy, probably traumatized him, and made him an unattached outcast from his own people.¹⁰ Even in the “instant” transitions, there is priming in the sense of both military desensitizing and targeting of the enemy group as dangerous or as “untermenschem.” In what Waller (2002) describes as the “culture of cruelty,” the Japanese Army had practiced brutal induction techniques that included systemic abuse of soldiers by officers and the practice of killing live prisoners to overcome any aversion to killing humans with a bayonet (Chang, 1997, p. 217). Haritos-Fatouros (2003) describes induction techniques used to convert ordinary men into torturers in the Greece Military police after 1969. This was a five-stage process that included heavy political indoctrination and a hatred for communists. Selection was based on toughness, aggression, obedience, and loyalty (p. 37). About one third of potential recruits were dropped at the early selection process. Recruits were themselves beaten and abused (as

¹⁰ One set of sequelae from disattachment and what is known as “peritraumatic stress disorder” is the secretion of neurotransmitters (Van der Kolk, McFarlane, & Weisaeth, 1996). This involves activation of several brain-behavioral systems including neurotransmitter secretion, emotional regulation (hyperarousal), loss of emotions as signals, and memory malfunction (pp. 210–227). Prolonged combat exposure alters the structure of emotion-governing brain structures. Gurvitz, Shenton, and Pitman (1995) found that Vietnam veterans with the most intense combat exposure and with the most post traumatic stress disorder had an average shrinkage of 26% in the left and 22% in the right hippocampus compared with veterans who saw combat but had no symptoms.

with the Rwandan Militias and Japanese Army) and desensitized incrementally (p. 41). Their identities were stripped away and they existed in isolation from other military. They were deprived of food, sleep, and water. They were trained in physical torture techniques by being the object of abuse, flogging was routine. The rage generated by this treatment was then focused, through ideological means, onto the prisoners. About 90% of the class (after the initial cut) graduated. Even in this group, some torturers referred to their especially brutal colleagues as “animals.” On the other hand, Waller (2002, p. 6) describes a brutal SS camp commandant, Franz Zeries, who had no training but who changed from a devoted father and career soldier to a sadistic killer (this may take time as we shall see below). Lifton (1986), in describing the medical experiments performed on living beings by Nazi doctors, describes a “splitting” of the torturing actions to a separate self (sometimes called “doubling”) as “ego dystonic.” Waller (2002) relates doubling to a dissociative state. This raises the possibility that all activities carried on in transitional roles engage altered consciousness.

17. Short-term transition

In military massacres, there is an instant transition to a killing rage state that occurs after an order is given. The order is either to kill (Nanking) or is ambiguous (My Lai). Lifton (1973) descriptions of My Lai, based on eyewitness reports, suggested that the killing of civilians was accompanied by generalized rage and by expressions of anger and revenge toward the victims. Certainly, this was evident at Nanking and El Mozote. The question is “did rage cause the actions of violence or was it a reaction to the implementation of the order to kill?” Historically rooted hostility toward the target can generate dehumanization but more is required to generate rage killing. In My Lai, El Mozote, and Nanking, there were orders to kill from commanding officers. In My Lai, this is disputed but what is not disputed is the mind frame of the military at that point in time: frustration and anger that fellow soldiers had been killed by booby traps. This rage is more than mere obedience but orders to kill and the act of killing itself may generate higher levels of rage. Such extreme levels may drive the overkill actions of massacre.

Zimbardo (1969) describes “deindividuated aggression,” in which arousal and anomie combine to generate a self-rewarding form of aggression. The aggressive acts occur faster and with greater amplitude as they are rewarded through proprioceptive feedback from the musculature (for an empirical demonstration of escalation, see Bond & Dutton, 1975). Zimbardo (1969) suggests that rage generates rage, that violence self-amplifies so that when no restrictions on violence exist, violence increases in rate and force. Military massacres suggest that violence may also expand in scope. Rage killings appear to occur when the “rules of war” are clearly violated—i.e., civilians, women, and children are killed. By this model, the order to kill generates rage which then leads to overkill and a range of forms of violence. The form varies with the individual soldier and is improvised under a felt condition of impunity. In Nanking, the initial killing of captured Chinese soldiers was by machine gun and efficient. The killing of civilians was by sword, prolonged and rageful. Eventually “sport killing” ensued.

Zimbardo (1969) makes the provocative assumption that once normal inhibitions are overcome, the acting out of aggression is innately pleasurable, hence reward structure

changes from reward for slow actions (that are based on feedback from the actions of others) to fast actions (rewarded internally). While individual slayings in Rwanda, El Mozote, My Lai, or Nanking may contain aspects of deindividuated violence, there are elements of controlled violence in these settings as well. For example, violence in Nanking spread from killing by gunshot, to rape, torture, mutilation, and “killing games.” Yet no one was killed in the “Neutral Zone” created by the international community. Also, Zimbardo’s notion of deindividuation does not account for individual differences, only situational factors leading to escalation of a previously prohibited activity.

Baumeister and Campbell (1999) also raise the possibility of violence having an intrinsic appeal. Baumeister and Campbell again argue that based on several anecdotal reports, the initial reaction to killing or hurting others seems to be aversive but the distress subsides over time while pleasure in harming others emerges over time. A minority of perpetrators appears to develop pleasure from killing or hurting. One explanation for this development is opponent-process theory (Solomon, 1980), which postulates that psychological processes are homeostatic, so that when an initial response to killing (the A-process, e.g., visceral aversion) occurs, it is followed by a restorative (B-process) which initially pleasant (e.g., recovering from aversion) though inefficient. Over time, the A-process diminishes and the B-process predominates. Solomon developed his theory in rat labs examining learning processes but it has been applied to addictions and to “traumatic bonding” in battered women (Dutton & Painter, 1980). Addiction to the B response explains the attraction to the once-aversive actions. Both Baumeister and Campbell and Zimbardo (1969) examine the potential pleasure of aggression once normative restraints have been reduced. Military massacres prove to be situations where normative constraints are not only reduced but new norms exhorting violence develop, in some cases (when an order is given) spontaneously.

18. Individual differences in violent aggression

One school of thought holds that it is ordinary people who commit extraordinary evil (e.g., Milgram, 1974; Browning, 1998; Waller, 2002). The strongest evidence for this position is that no pre-event evidence suggests any violent tendencies in people who commit extraordinary violence during genocides or massacres. A second school of thought argues that some people, even in toxic situations, behave especially badly (e.g., Browning, 1998 the Zimbardo et al., 1972 prison simulation, differential actions at My Lai); others make the best of a bad situation. This suggests individual differences even in extreme circumstances, but the proof of these differences is, of necessity, circular. While Waller’s (2002) example of Franz Zereis supports the notion of infinite malleability from normalcy, counter-examples exist. Browning (1998) cites the example of reserve German policemen who unexpectedly received orders to kill civilians. There was evidence for extreme aversive reactions to the acts of killing and traumatic memories.

Waller’s (2002) escape from this conundrum is to suggest that “emphasizing that ordinary people commit extraordinary evil does not preclude the possibility that certain types of individuals may be more likely than others to engage in destructive obedience” (p. 123). Waller

develops a multifactor model to explain this process comprised of four levels of contributing factors. These are as follows: (1) our ancestral shadow: ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and a desire for social dominance; and (2) identities of the perpetrators: their cultural belief systems, moral disengagement, and rational self-interest. Both of these are “actor” (perpetrator) level factors. They can combine with (3) a culture of cruelty: professional socialization, binding factors of the group, and the merger of role and person; and (4) social dearth of the victims: us–them thinking, dehumanization, and blaming of the victims. Waller argues that these four levels of factors acting in concert produce a new self and that extraordinary evil become a part of that self. Waller’s theory is a nice conceptualization of these various factors. However, the question remains, have we adequately explained why extraordinary violence exists?

Baumeister and Campbell (1999) argue that a shift to B-process action does not hold for all soldiers because differential levels of guilt moderate the response. Toch (1969/1993) found that 6% of his sample of violent men found pleasure in harming others. Groth (1979) concluded that 5% of rapists derived pleasure from their victims’ suffering. Judging by descriptions of the massacres above and the universality of military rape (see below), that number may be elevated by the context of the war, possibly by lowering the restrictions placed by guilt under normal socialization. Baumeister and Campbell see evidence for this contention in the number of hunters who enjoy the activity (far above 6%) because, compared to killing humans, the guilt is less. Thirdly, threatened egotism is an individual variable leading to violence. In the context of, for example, the Japanese Army or the Hutu, there was ample historical bases for lowered self-esteem. In the Japanese Army, it was part of basic training, with the Hutu it was a historical belief of their status vis-à-vis the Tutsi.

Mawson’s notions of the origins of arousal in combat situations, the cognitive shifts, and the high-intensity, escalating aggression that is a hallmark of deindividuated behavior, begin to add explanatory texture to the forms of brutality displayed in massacres. High-intensity killing of long duration suggests a type of trance state accompanied by extreme arousal. There is a strong likelihood that actions carried out in short-term transitional states are done under altered states of consciousness. Zimbardo (1969) describes an “expanded present” and Baumeister “foreshortened future” and focus on discrete concrete acts as hallmarks of this cognitive state. There is also considerable evidence that dissociation (compartmentalization of experience) is commonplace in PTSD (Van der Kolk et al., 1996). Less is known about peritraumatic states but the neurological and physiological hyperactivity that contributes to PTSD originates in peritraumatic stress. Baumeister and Campbell (1999) provide evidence that 20–30% of battle soldiers suffer from PTSD caused by their own violent actions.

A theory to account for the individual differences that appear to occur during massacres must somehow point to the relative restraint shown by some soldiers (in My Lai some refused to follow orders), the routine of “killing as ordered” by others, and the overkill (rape, torture, mutilation) performed still by others. This latter form of killing is inefficient and makes no sense militarily (unless it is used as a threat to others). In the Zimbardo et al. (1972) Stanford prison study, one third of the guards became abusive (one third followed the directives of the study and one third tried to do small favors for the prisoners). Waller would argue that differences in “moral disengagement” in perpetrators may account for these differences.

While these processes may occur in situations of violent anomie where orders to kill are understood (although not always issued), not all combatants engage in overkill. Waller (2002) argues that it is differences in “moral disengagement” and “identities.” Mawson (1987) argues for individual differences in ego strength and stimulus seeking (arousability, identity maintenance). Baumeister and Campbell (1999) argue for differential levels of guilt operating on B-process shifts. None of these accounts per se explains the form of violence used by individual perpetrators. To date, interviews with perpetrators have yielded little in the way of insight. Perpetrators in Nanking, My Lai, and Rwanda have been interviewed (Brownmiller, 1975; Chang, 1997; Frontline, 2004). None could say anything more than that they did not understand their actions and seemed to have been possessed by devils. In My Lai, soldiers either rationalized killing as having been ordered or initially denied involvement in rape, etc., and then eventually described the Vietnamese women as “it wasn’t like they were human. . .they were a gook or commie and it was OK.” (Brownmiller, 1975, p, 109). It seems that, where possible, more thorough psychological assessments that go beyond self-reports of massacres perpetrators should be done. Suedfeld (2000) reported that “psychometric instruments and content analyses” were used to examine the Nuremberg defendants. None of the studies was able to pinpoint anything unique in the Nazi’s personalities, family histories that would explain their actions in the Holocaust.

In reviewing personality factors in becoming a torturer in Greece, Argentina, and Germany, Staub (1999) found the same traits as with *genocidaires*; authoritarianism; and strong in-group conformity and out-group devaluation. However, in the final analysis, Staub warns about inferring personality traits from the in-role behavior, citing the immense pressures to behave according to the role demands.

19. Final thoughts

“It is always a simple matter to drag people along whether it is a democracy, or a fascist dictatorship, or a parliament, or a communist dictatorship. Voice or no voice, the people can always be bought to the bidding of the leaders. This is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked, and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the same in every country.”—Herman Goering, Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, at the Nuremberg Trials.

Suedfeld (2001) reviewed explanations of the Holocaust and found five continua of theories: specificity versus generalizability, historical continuity, external versus internal causes (e.g., economic conditions vs. psychological processes), mutability (is the event-driven by a leader or small cadre), the scope of responsibility, and the role of intent or insight. Our approach here has been on generalizability: processes social and psychological that are common to all genocides or to massacres. Where relevant, we have pointed out shortcomings in our understanding of extreme violence. Hence, we have sought to outline psychological processes engaged in during the events (or, in the case of genocide just prior to the event) and especially those that contribute to transformation of the perpetrator. We have paid scant attention to historical precedents. Initially, we have attempted to relate the behavior of *genocidaires* to forensic explanation.

Historical and socioeconomic explanations seem better at accounting for the conditions initiating genocide or pogrom but once the violence begins, individual actions require individual explanation. We have struggled with the issue of whether toxic situations can produce extreme violence in all and if so whether they do so by disinhibiting a sadistic aspect of the human condition (Baumeister & Campbell, 1999; Browning, 1998; Goldhagen, 1994; Zimbardo, 1969, argument for actions of many Germans during the Holocaust) or whether certain individuals enact disproportionate violence while others passively enable. It seems that even in “toxic situations,” where the level of individual atrocity is raised, individual differences continue to exist. Zimbardo et al. (1972) and Baumeister and Campbell (1999) both provide evidence on this point and in My Lai, some soldiers shot civilians, others refused.

Taking into account Staub’s (1999) work and viewing the extreme abuse here, it seems that one conclusion regarding mass slaughter is to say that symbolically, out-groups become threats to the in-groups’ view of their place in the world. This may constitute a form of “group egotism” similar to that describe by Baumeister and Campbell (1999). That group view may be inflated or exalted but once held with conviction and socially supported in the way Staub describes, it generates the conclusion that all actions against the out-group are justifiable acts of perceived revenge. Without “subjective revenge” as a motive, it is difficult to explain the sadism and savagery displayed. Of course, subjective revenge can include the perception that an out-group is standing in the way of a groups’ exalted view that they are entitled to world dominance.

It is apparent too that the explanation of the specific forms of violence, rape, mutilation, torture, etc., is not forthcoming from current psychological knowledge. All are forms of extreme sadism but how sadism is developed in specific ways is still not clear. We do know that perpetrators are stressed, desensitized, and view their victims as threats or as subhuman, yet utilize forms of sadism that require human mores and reactions in order to have effect. We know that B-process dominance with time diminishes revulsion to ones’ own brutality. Forensic psychology views such actions as the consequences of pathological developmental issues. Social psychological explanations (e.g., Zimbardo, 1969) have suggested that “state” aggression can be produced by pathological situations. Zimbardo (1969) suggests that power imbalances, lack of oversight, and competing purposes among groups were a toxic mix and produced abusive behavior from normal college age men under such circumstances. It seems, however, that psychology has not attempted to account for the extremity of massacre or the implications of massacre for notions of the human condition. Part of this shortcoming may be due to the methods of experimental psychology.

It may be that psychology needs form of “forensic ethology” that reconstructs the patterns and motives for behavior from “natural observation”: tribunal transcripts of massacres or survivor reports exist and can be followed up with studies of massacre perpetrators under “normal” (i.e., post war) conditions. Corroborative information could be sought regarding violent tendencies in civilian settings. Some of these techniques are used in psychohistorical approaches (see Brownmiller, 1975; Chang, 1997; Loewenberg, 1983; Suedfeld, 2001). However, in forensic analysis, more weight is put on what information and state of mind would have be required for specific actions to occur (see, for example, Dietz et al., 1991). Darley (1999) has suggested “probes into the conceptual word of individuals who are enlisted into real-world harm-doing socialization processes” (p. 629). Only such a methodology may answer the

ultimate question of whether normal men who show no prior propensity for violent crime can act like sexual sadists during pogrom.

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